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 COMPARING RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN CUSTODY CASES
Katharine T. Bartlett*
There is no shortage of legal scholarship on the relationship between
race and sex discrimination. Most of this scholarship over the past dec-
ade, however, has focused on the “intersection” between the two, along
with related issues of multidimensionality, multiple consciousness, and
anti-essentialism.1 This Lecture focuses on race and sex, not where they
cross, but what they look like side by side. The legal world has become
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author wishes to thank Amy Welch for her able research assistance. This Lecture was deliv-
ered at the 1999 Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture at Hofstra Uni-
versity School of Law on October 27, 1999. The Author wishes to thank Professor John
DeWitt Gregory, the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, for his
kind invitation to deliver this lecture.
1. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-72 (explaining that to combat racism or sex-
ism requires the formulation of legal theory and public policy that recognizes the interde-
pendence of racism and sexism); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (arguing that the treatment of
“race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis [distorts] the
multidimensionality of Black women’s experience”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentia l-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN . L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (attacking “gender essen-
tialism—the notion that a unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be . . . described inde-
pendently of race”); Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of
African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM . U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8-9
(1995) (discussing the treatment of African American women within the criminal justice
system); Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a
Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 45, 72 (1988) (explaining that the recognition of
African Americans as a “separate and distinct” group requires acknowledgment that “two
innate and inerasable traits, being both black and female, [contribute to their] special status
in American society”); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness
as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RT S. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (positing that African
American women bifurcate their experiences and histories as women and as African Ameri-
cans in performing legal analysis); Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situ-
ating Women of Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 846-
47 (1997) (advocating for the inclusion of women of color in the discussion over affirmative
action).
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accustomed to talking in the same breath about race and sex, or about
women and minorities—in non-discrimination legislation, in legal scholar-
ship, and in common parlance—as if discrimination based on these fac-
tors operated the same way. Yet, there has been little systematic effort
to compare the similarities of race and sex discrimination, at least not re-
cently. Justice Brennan, back in 1973, in a failing effort by four Justices
of the United States Supreme Court to obtain suspect classification status
for sex, made the case for treating sex like race by stating that sex, like
race, is an “immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth,” which “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society.”2 Little has been done in the last quarter-century to
extend our thinking about the similarities between race and sex beyond
these words, except perhaps (and oddly enough) to conclude that catego-
ries based on race, and even sex, are not immutable after all.3
Neither has much nuanced thinking been done on the differences
between race and sex discrimination. One of the conclusions of the vast
intersectionality literature is that the addition of race discrimination to sex
discrimination does not merely make it worse, but changes the nature of
the discrimination.4 This claim asserts qualitative, not just quantitative,
differences between race and sex discrimination. Yet, these differences
have not yet been spelled out in any systematic detail. Some scholars
have offered examples to show how black women may experience a
wrong differently from white women,5 or black men,6 but these examples
2. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375,
1446 (1999) (arguing that race is not an immutable, biological trait, and the United States
Supreme Court has not treated it as such, but rather as a social and political category); Janet
E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN . L. REV. 503, 506, 549-50 (1994) (arguing that protection of indi-
viduals from discrimination based on their sexual orientation should not be based on immuta-
bility arguments, because persons can suppress expression of their sexual orientation); Linda
Nicholson, Interpreting Gender, 20 SIGNS 79, 79-83 (1994) (reasoning that sex cannot be
understood as a biological given, since the body is itself a variable, which is always seen
through social interpretation, and thus cannot ground cross-cultural claims).
4. See Harris, supra  note 1, at 592.
5. See, e.g., Mary Maynard, ‘Race’, Gender and the Concept of ‘Difference’ in Femi-
nist Thought, in  T HE DYNAMICS OF ‘RACE’ AND GENDER: SOME FEMINIST
INTERVENTIONS 9, 14 (Haleh Afshar & Mary Maynard eds., 1994) (noting that black
women are more likely than white women to experience the family as not simply a site of
women’s subordination but also one of resistance and solidarity against racism); Harris, supra
note 1, at 598-99 (explaining that, for black women, rape is a more complex experience
deeply rooted in color as opposed to gender alone). Black women understand rape differently
from white women, given that “the paradigm experience of rape for Black women has his-
torically involved the white employer in the kitchen or bedroom as much as the strange
Black man in the bushes”; that rape against black women during slavery was not even recog-
nized as a crime; that, even after the Civil War, rape laws were not used to protect black
BART.PPR2 03/14/01  10:29 AM
2000] RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN CUSTODY CASES 879
have not yet added up to a systematic analysis of the differences be-
tween race and sex discrimination, and how these differences should
matter in the law.
This Lecture focuses on a topic in family law—child custody—as a
starting point for a more detailed assessment of the similarities and dif-
ferences between sex and race discrimination. It was Professor John
DeWitt Gregory who first challenged me to think more deeply about this
issue. One of the provisions I drafted as a Reporter for the American
Law Institute (“ALI”) Principles of Family Dissolution Project,7 on
which Professor Gregory was an Adviser, is a “non-discrimination” pro-
vision that prohibits courts from considering in custody cases any of the
usual factors: race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or sexual orientation. Profes-
sor Gregory, early on in the project, questioned me about lumping all of
these non-discrimination factors together. “They are different, aren’t
they?” he insisted. “Shouldn’t there be a separate provision for each, re-
flecting the differences?” I resisted at first, but his questions eventually
led me to try to think more comparatively about these separate factors.
This Lecture focuses on the operation of, and attempts to eliminate,
race and sex discrimination in child custody law. The methodology I use
is to move back and forth between examples of race discrimination and
sex discrimination, showing how looking at one in relation to the other
contributes to a better understanding of both.8 In doing so, I try to resist
women because they were considered promiscuous by nature; and that “for black people,
male and female, ‘rape’ signified the terrorism of black men by white men, aided and abetted,
passively (by silence) or actively (by ‘crying rape’), by white women.” Id.
Several commentators have argued that discrimination against black women in em-
ployment often goes unrecognized insofar as the discrimination does not appear to affect all
blacks, or all women. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra  note 1, at 144.
6. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra  note 1, at 143 (noting that, in the context of emplo y-
ment discrimination, “Black women are protected only to the extent that their experiences
coincide with those of [white women or black men]”).
7. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, §2.14 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part
I, 1998).
8. Some have warned that comparing race and sex discrimination reinforces racism
due to the fact that when concerns for race are combined with other concerns, the signifi-
cance of race tends to get marginalized. See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman,
Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons Between Ra-
cism and Sexism (Or Other
-Isms) , 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 399 (noting that when sexism and racism are compared, “the
significance of race [is] marginalized and obscured, and the different role that race plays in
the lives of people of color and of whites [is] overlooked”). On the one hand, this Lecture
may prove the point, in that it allocates more space and time to gender than to race. On the
other hand, if there are insights to be gained from examining one form of discrimination in
light of the other, a fire wall between the two will block these insights. In this Lecture I ac-
knowledge that gender issues tend to overshadow issues of race in custody matters, and I of-
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the temptation to offer grand generalizations and broad historical com-
parisons. I do not compare and contrast, for example, the legacy of slav-
ery of African Americans and the legal subordination of women, al-
though many similarities and differences exist. I do not compare and
contrast the benign rationalizations offered in support of the subordination
of blacks and women throughout history, nor how the relationships of
wives, mothers, daughters, and sisters to the men in their lives have less-
ened, or worsened, as compared to the relationships of various racial mi-
norities to white people. These broader points of contrast and comparison
may come later when I apply this comparative approach to race and sex
discrimination to other contexts, including employment, education, the po-
litical process, and, perhaps, entertainment and sports. At this point, how-
ever, my work is guided by the insights yielded from a close, piece-by-
piece examination of a specific area. I want to build from the bottom up
the similarities and differences and get these right, before committing to
more universal propositions.
I. DISCRIMINATION AND ROLE POLICING
I first consider Palmore v. Sidoti,9 a custody case involving a white
couple, Linda and Anthony, and their three-year-old daughter, Melanie.10
Linda was awarded custody of Melanie after the couple’s divorce.11 A
year later, when Linda began “cohabiting with a Negro, Clarence Pal-
more, Jr., whom she married two months later,” the biological father,
Anthony, sought custody himself.12 The trial court granted the father’s
modification motion, reasoning that:
despite the strides that have been made in bettering relations between
the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, if allowed to
remain in her present situation and attains [sic] school age and thus
more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization
that is sure to come.13
The Supreme Court took a hard line in this case, holding that it is
impermissible for a court to give effect to private, racial prejudice in
fer a preliminary explanation. If comparing race to sex leads to more racism, the connection
should be further explored and problems remedied, rather than blocking off the area of in-
quiry.
9. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
10. See id. at 430.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 431 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the findings of the trial court below).
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custody cases, at any time and under any circumstances.14 The Court
insisted that “[w]hatever problems  racially mixed households may pose
for children in 1984,” the state cannot give them effect.15 In taking this
position, the Court did not deny that children may suffer as a result of ig-
noring race.16 Rather, it concluded almost categorically that the harm of
considering race in a custody case is greater than the possible gains.17
Race must be ignored to serve a greater good than the possible welfare
of an individual child.18
No case so clearly prohibits consideration of sex in custody cases. It
should be noted, however, that there was a potential gender issue in
Palmore that received no attention from the Supreme Court. It appears
that Linda began cohabiting with Clarence before they were married.19
According to the trial court, the mother’s “‘see[ing] fit to bring a man
into her home and carry[ing] on a sexual relationship with him without
being married to him’” showed that she “‘tended to place gratification of
her own desires ahead of her concern for the child’s future welfare.’”20
Nothing more seems to have been made of this factor, either by the trial
court or on review, but some courts have since noticed that mothers who
cohabit outside of marriage tend to be penalized in ways fathers who co-
habit outside of marriage are not, and have concluded that differential
treatment constitutes sex discrimination.21
Practitioners, scholars, and, increasingly, appellate courts have iden-
tified and sought to eradicate a double standard based on sex in custody
disputes.22 Criticized, for example, are cases that appear to attach a dif-
14. See id. at 433.
15. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
16. See id. at 433.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 434.
19. See id. at 430.
20. Id. at 431 (quoting the findings of the trial court below).
21. See, e.g., Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30-31 (App. Div. 1990) (re-
versing custody award to the father by the trial court, which had allowed extensive testimony
regarding the mother’s alleged affair and had allowed no similar line of questioning regarding
the father); cf. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (deter-
mining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the mother’s infidelity
against her). See generally Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of
the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291,
303-11 (1992) (describing cases in which mothers and fathers who have had extramarital
affairs are evaluated differently in custody disputes).
22. See, e.g., D. Kelly Weisberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of
Motherhood: Marcia Clark’s Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 295, 322 (1995)
(arguing that “professional mothers are . . . treated differently than similarly situated men”
such that working women are expected to be perfect mothers or choose between their work-
life and family-life while “[f]athers are confronted neither with the expectation of parental
perfectibility nor the demand that they make a choice”).
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ferent significance to employment by mothers outside the home than they
attach to employment by fathers.23 In these cases, courts seem to expect
fathers to work outside the home, and respect them for their employment
success.24 In contrast, mothers, although they also usually work outside
the home, are expected to make compromises in their careers for their
children, and are penalized when they do not.25 One South Carolina ap-
pellate court, for example, affirmed an award of custody to the father,
who was an oilman, based in part on an analysis of how much time the
mother, who was an obstetrician, would have to be away from home and
what caretaking arrangements she would have for the child; no such
analysis of the father’s work schedule or baby-sitting arrangements is
mentioned in the opinion.26 An Ohio appellate court upheld a custody
award to the father, even though the mother had been the primary care-
taker for all four of the couple’s children for seventeen years, because,
during the last year before the divorce, she worked part-time, attended
school, and was away from the home for large amounts of time, which
the trial court characterized as “‘selfish.’”27 A Delaware court blamed
the mother who worked, rather than the father who also worked, for not
having made a strong enough effort to persevere through the couple’s
marital problems and for not having given up her career aspirations until
her children were raised, if necessary.28
Similarly, caretaking by mothers sometimes is taken for granted by
courts in custody cases, whereas when fathers “help out,” their contribu-
tions tend to be highly exaggerated.29 An at-home father in an Iowa
case, for example, was credited with having “relieved” the mother of
numerous child raising problems that occurred during her working hours,
even though she worked from 5:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., and performed all
the responsibilities for the family during her nonworking hours.30 Similar
23. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 22, at 298-309 (discussing cases in which women
have been denied custody because of their demanding careers); see also  infra  notes 26-28 and
accompanying text (outlining three court cases that reflect the disparate treatment of
working mothers in custody battles).
24. See infra  notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
25. See Weisberg, supra note 22, at 322.
26. See Richmond v. Tecklenberg, 396 S.E.2d 111, 114 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
27. See Olive v. Olive, No. 91CA005200, 1992 WL 139997, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 17, 1992) (quoting the findings of the trial court below).
28. See James E.S. v. Sondra K.S., No. CN89-6810, 1990 WL 91603, at *4 (Del. Fam.
Ct. June 14, 1990).
29. See, e.g., cases cited infra  note 30-32 and accompanying text.
30. See In re Marriage of Fennell, 485 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); see
also  Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 919-20 (N.D. 1985) (affirming custody
award to the father based on the fact that, although the mother was the primary caretaker
and knew more about the children, the father had baby-sat the children, learned about their
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issues were raised in the highly publicized Young v. Hector31 case in
Florida. Young involved a lawyer, Alice Hector, and her unemployed
husband, who at one point in the litigation was awarded custody of his
children based on his involvement in their school and after-school activi-
ties, even though a housekeeper provided most of the caretaking during
the day when he was home and the mother provided their primary care
in the mornings, evenings, and on weekends.32
Before I go further, let me acknowledge what you may have al-
ready noticed, which is that this Lecture is already somewhat off kilter,
with discussion of sex overwhelming that about race. This imbalance is
present also in the cases, as there are far more appellate custody cases
that raise issues of sex than there are those that raise issues of race.
One explanation might be that expectations about parents are determined
more by their sex than by their race; another is that sex is more concep-
tually central to one’s identity than race. 33 But it may be as simple as
that parents fighting for custody are far more likely to be of different
sexes than they are of different races, making it possible to observe a
double standard within a single case—at least when both parents have
had affairs, or worked the same number of hours outside the home and
performed identical parenting roles.
Although there are more sex discrimination cases than race dis-
crimination ones, both are enabled by the open-ended best-interests test
applied in custody cases, which invites bias of all types. The best-
interests test is an empty vessel, to be filled by the subjective views of
judges about what is good for children, including views about sex and
race. 34 It is possible, however, that one of the reasons race discrimina-
tion cases are less frequent than sex discrimination is that such cases are
care, and was now more focused on them, while the mother had since begun seeking a social
life outside the home in the evenings and was a “‘strongwilled’” “‘career mother’” who be-
lieved “‘that a life limited to homemaking is not adequate to fulfill her needs’”) (quoting the
findings of the trial court below); Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 16 (W.
Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that the father, an architect, was con-
sidered an equal caretaker with the stay-at-home mother on the basis that he “helped in the
evenings and [on] weekends”).
31. 740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
32. See id. at 1158-61 (upholding, upon rehearing en banc, trial court award to mother
and reversing appellate panel which had held that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s award).
33. See Anthony Appiah, “But Would That Still Be Me?”: Notes on Gender, “Race,”
Ethnicity, As Sources of “Identity,” in RACE/SEX:  THEIR SAMENESS,  DIFFERENCE, AND
INTERPLAY 75, 78-79 (Naomi Zack ed., 1997).
34. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American
Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best
Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1999).
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more difficult to recognize.
There are a handful of reported modification cases that involve
white mothers losing custody after having affairs with black men.35
Every one of these cases affirms the change of custody on grounds that
there were other legal justifications for the modification besides race,
such as the fact that the mother lied about the affair, or that her sexual
activity displayed bad moral judgment.36 It is difficult to second-guess
these cases under a best-interests test because it is not a test that com-
pels transparency. Race and sex may simply intersect one another, each
factor thereby obscuring the significance of the other. It is suspicious,
however, that race discrimination is virtually never recognized in custody
cases, except when it is stipulated.  37
A close look at the fundamentals of sex discrimination cases might
help us better to identify cases of race discrimination. What we can ob-
serve in the sex cases is that discrimination serves to reinforce conven-
tional roles—to keep mother in her place as sexually faithful, totally dedi-
cated to her children and family, and to keep father in his place as
primary provider. With this model in mind, another look at Palmore re-
veals some troubling, but revealing, possibilities. In Palmore, the trial
court (and the father) articulated the problem of Melanie’s suffering as a
result of the racial animus of others.38 Rethinking the case in terms of the
possibility of role policing, one may wonder if the trial court’s concern
was, instead, that there is something improper about a family consisting
of different races. In other words, for the trial court, the threat to
Melanie may not have been a problem of peers no one could control, but
rather parents—a white mother and black stepfather who crossed the
line—straying too far from their appropriate racial tracks.
In this regard, I note that the Supreme Court in Palmore refers ap-
provingly to its 1917 decision39 in Buchanan v. Warley,40 overturning a
35. See, e.g., Jennings v. Jennings, 490 So. 2d 10, 12-13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (con-
cluding that award of custody of children to father, after mother entered into an affair with a
black doctor, was based on mother’s sexual activity, not the race of her paramour); Jones v.
Jones, 937 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that mother’s allegation that trial
court modified custody to father based on mother’s association with black men was not sup-
ported by the record); Parker v. Parker, 986 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 1999) (disapproving
trial court’s references to race in its decision, but nonetheless upholding trial court award of
child to father after mother had affair with African American doctor, on grounds that the
decision was based on factors like the mother’s lying and her extra-marital affair, rather than
race).
36. See cases cited supra  note 35.
37. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citing findings of the trial court
below).
38. See id. at 431 (citing findings of the trial court below).
39. See id. at 433-34.
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Kentucky law that forbade whites and “Negroes” from buying houses in
each other’s neighborhoods.41 What is interesting about Buchanan is
that it disapproved of a series of offered purposes for the Kentucky stat-
ute,42 including the purpose of “‘prevent[ing] conflict and ill-feeling be-
tween the white and colored races[,] . . . preserv[ing] the public
peace,’”43 and protecting property values from depreciating on account
of a breakdown in the racial integrity of a neighborhood.44 The Court
found each of these purposes constitutionally insufficient to justify the
statute.45 However, a fourth rationale—that of preserving racial purity—
was handled differently.46 Rather than dismissing the motive as illegiti-
mate, the Court went to some trouble to redefine the issue of the case47
so as to avoid having to commit itself one way or the other on this mo-
tive. The case, the Court explained, “does not deal with an attempt to
prohibit the amalgamation of the races,” but rather with the “civil right
of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a per-
son of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white
person.”48 This resistance to confronting the impulse to protect racial pu-
rity suggests that there may have been some sympathy with the fear of
racial amalgamation. Could this sympathy remain in some form? This is
not the kind of thing one can easily prove, but consider whether the trial
court in Palmore would have been equally concerned about Melanie if
Mrs. Sidoti was African American, and her second marriage was to a
white man. If the justification was really the stigma of living in a mixed-
race household, one would expect the same concern. But if racial purity
was the objective—given the historical context in which the white race is
the only race with a perceived purity to protect—one would not expect
the addition of a white parent to a black parent’s home to raise the same
fears about a child’s welfare.
40. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
41. See id. at 70-71, 82.
42. See id. at 81.
43. Id. at 70 (quoting ordinance of the City of Louisville, approved May 11, 1914).
44. See id. at 82.
45. See id. (observing that “property may [also] be acquired by undesirable white neigh-
bors or put to disagreeable though lawful uses with like results”).
46. See id. at 73-74, 81 (mentioning the preservation of racial purity as a motivation
twice).
47. See id. at 75.
48. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
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II. DISCRIMINATION AND DISPARATE EFFECTS
Another set of discrimination claims concerns the complaint of fa-
thers that the sex-based double standard works against them, not in their
favor. The evidence offered is circumstantial, but rather impressive:
women obtain custody in eighty to ninety percent of cases.49 What is one
to make of this disparity? In other contexts in which women, or minori-
ties, receive an end of the stick that is this short, suspicions would be high
indeed.
One needs to look more carefully at exactly what is being claimed
here. The claim assumes that sex equality demands equal results for men
and women but, if this is the case, how should such equal results be
measured? One possibility is that mothers and fathers be awarded cus-
tody an equal percentage of the time. Another is that both parents be
awarded equal time with the child at divorce in each case, i.e., joint
physical custody. One might protest that such approaches ignore the
child’s best interests, but if the child’s interests do not justify race-based
custody decision-making, arguably neither are they sufficient to trump
society’s interest in avoiding sex discrimination.
An alternative response is that race and sex discrimination are dif-
ferent, and that avoiding race discrimination is worth a higher price than
avoiding sex discrimination. This proposition, however, requires a dis-
tasteful and virtually imponderable balancing of injustices. The better
analysis questions the claimed analogy between the father’s claim and
the sex and race claims examined thus far. What occurred in Palmore
was, by stipulation, race discrimination;50 the question posed by the case
was whether it was justified. The statistical disparity for mother custody,
in contrast, proves only disparate results, not that discrimination has actu-
ally occurred; and one cannot get to the question of whether sex dis-
crimination is justified until it is determined whether or not sex discrimi-
nation has occurred.
49. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY &  ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 99-103 (1992). Actually, fathers do not do
all that badly, vis-a-vis mothers, when they contest custody. See generally id. at 99-106.
Here, estimates vary widely, but it appears that in formally contested cases, women get cus-
tody only about half the time, or less. See id. at 104 (reporting results of California study
showing that in contested cases in which each parent wanted sole custody, fathers won
11.3% of the time, as compared to 45.3% for mothers, 35.9% for joint custody, and 7.5%
for split custody); Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal
of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 256-57 (1994) (reporting
Utah study of 1087 cases decided between 1970 and 1993, showing that where custody was
formally disputed, custody was awarded to the mother 50% of the time, to the father 21% of
the time, and to both parents jointly or in a split custody arrangement 30% of the time).
50. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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Here, I would distinguish between two possibilities. On the one
hand, some of the disparity in favor of mothers may be because courts
evaluate claims by fathers with a bias against them, based on the belief,
conscious or otherwise, that mothers are better parents. While this type
of discrimination—like the examples given earlier of a double standard
against women in custody cases—is not easy to identify, it is sex dis-
crimination when it occurs and should be prohibited.
On the other hand, disparate results against men could be the result
of the neutral application of custody standards meant to protect the best
interests of the child. Child custody standards tend to stress past care-
taking and emotional bonds which are generally generated through care-
taking relationships, because it is thought that these are the best meas-
ures of the best interests of the child.51 To state an obvious social fact,
mothers are, on average, more actively engaged than fathers, on aver-
age, in the caretaking of their children before divorce.52 Studies show
that, on average, mothers are available for their children twice as much
as fathers, spend three times as much time in face-to-face interactions
(as opposed to passive baby-sitting), and outperform fathers nine to one
when it comes to taking the responsibility of arranging child care, making
medical appointments, deciding on the child’s clothing, staying home
when the child is ill, and other such matters.53 Note that, while the aver-
age woman invests more in her children, the average man invests more
in his education and career, works longer hours, and builds up more ex-
tensive work experience.54 Given these social realities, one should be no
more surprised by the fact that women most often get custody at divorce
than by the fact that men, on average, earn more than women.
Yet again one might protest: women’s rights advocates complain
about earning less than men. Are not fathers’ rights complaints in this
context of the same order, deserving of the same recognition? To be
sure, neither men nor women should have it both ways in this debate. But
it is important to define what constitutes nondiscriminatory treatment in
each context. When the father’s qualifications are judged differently than
51. See, e.g, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.187(3)(a)(i) (West Supp. 1996) (noting
that, in determining residential provisions for a child, the court must consider “[t ]he relative
strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent, including whether
a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the
daily needs of the child”).
52. See Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won’t Fit,
31 FAM. L.Q. 119, 127 (1997).
53. See Michael E. Lamb et al., A Biosocial Perspective on Paternal Behavior and In-
volvement, in PARENTING ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 111, 126-29
(Jane B. Lancaster et al. eds., 1987).
54. See Bartlett, supra  note 34, at 473-74.
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the qualifications of the mother, under the same standard, this is sex dis-
crimination, just as it is sex discrimination when women are evaluated by
different criteria than men in the workplace. Also, when the criteria for
determining a child’s best interests have been stacked—for example,
when undue weight is given to certain factors because those factors are
associated with women, and thus tend to favor them—this is sex dis-
crimination, just as it is sex discrimination to adopt job criteria because
the jobs are designed with men in mind. When neither of these things is
going on, however, and when the criteria used are designed appropriately
to serve the legitimate purpose of protecting the child’s best interests, the
problem, if there is one, is not one of sex discrimination—at least not sex
discrimination in custody decision-making.
Few seriously would propose that employers have an obligation to
pay women more simply because otherwise they will not, on average,
make as much as men. The same applies to men and child custody. Men
should not be awarded custody more often just to equalize results for fa-
thers and mothers. Society may wish to alter cultural expectations that
make caretaking an activity governed by gender, just as society may
choose to alter the expectations that lead men to disproportionately invest
their labor in market employment. If either of these social revolutions
succeed and men assume more caretaking responsibility for children,
women are likely to earn more money, and men are likely to fare better
in custody cases. Before they succeed, however, men (and women) will
have to put up with a disparate impact in custody cases.
This works both ways. In a 1986 California case, Burchard v. Ga-
ray,55 the state supreme court ruled out consideration of remarriage and
economic stability as factors in custody cases.56 A concurring opinion in
the case by Chief Justice Rose Bird asserted that consideration of these
factors is illegitimate because such consideration systematically disfavors
women and favors men.57 If one rejects the disparate impact claim by
fathers discussed above, one needs to reject this analysis as well, and I
do. This does not mean, necessarily, that the factors of remarriage and
economic stability should be relevant in custody cases. In my view they
are not, but for a different reason, which I will explain shortly.
This prolonged discussion of fathers’ rights claims reveals a signifi-
cant difference between race and sex discrimination in custody cases.
Societal differences between mothers and fathers with respect to the
practices and expectations of childrearing should lead one to expect that
55. 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986).
56. See id. at 491-92.
57. See id. at 493-96 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
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custody cases would be skewed in favor of mothers. Also, it gives fur-
ther support to the proposition that parenting is governed more by gender
than by race. I say this tentatively, and only because I know of no differ-
ences between whites and blacks or other racial groups that would be
thought reasonably to bear on custody decisions and that are comparable
to those that exist with respect to differences between mothers and fa-
thers. If I am right, the fact that custody is skewed as to sex is only to be
expected, under current social circumstances, while skewed results as to
race is not.
III. DISCRIMINATION AND BENIGN MOTIVES
Next consider the case of a mixed race couple, Sarah, who is white,
and Bob, who is black. Their biological, biracial son, Ralph, perceives
himself, and is perceived by others, as black. At the divorce of Sarah and
Bob, Bob uses this fact to argue that Ralph should live with him.
This case might seem like a harder case than Palmore.58 If it does,
this is probably because the benign purpose of furthering the child’s posi-
tive racial identity seems more persuasive, and more genuine—in other
words, less of a pretext—than the racial stigma argument offered in
Palmore.59 Ralph will live in a world in which he will almost certainly
face discrimination as a result of being perceived as black, and because
Bob shares this experience, it may be thought that he has more to teach
Ralph on the subject than Sarah does. This might be viewed as a claim
for affirmative action that could be justified in the same way one might
justify hiring preferences for Hispanic police to patrol Hispanic neighbor-
hoods, or hiring preferences for African American teachers in African
American neighborhood schools: taking account of race-related factors
that are relevant to jobs that need doing, so that the jobs will be better
done.
Consider, however, the same claims made in the context of gender
role modeling. Sam is twelve. His parents, Dave and Marge, each want
primary custody at divorce. Dave argues that he should have primary
custody of Sam, even though Marge has been Sam’s primary caretaker
throughout the marriage, because Sam is entering adolescence and fig-
uring out what it means to be a man. Marge could make the same argu-
ments in her own favor, if their child were twelve-year-old Doris.
There is at least one interesting difference between these two ex-
amples. While the case for matching as to both race and sex could be
58. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
59. See id. at 431 (citing findings by the trial court).
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viewed as helping children deal with adverse social circumstances, the
argument for race modeling only runs one way. One would not expect
white parents to make this argument based on the need of their white
children for a healthy race identity, and if they did, you would not expect
them to succeed. Gender role modeling arguments, however, run both
ways: in favor of fathers seeking custody of their boys and mothers
seeking custody of their girls. These arguments are based on a notion
that there are two distinct sexes—indeed, biologically distinct—each with
different skills to be learned, manners (and mannerisms) to be absorbed,
habits to be ingrained, desires to be reinforced, and attitudes to be taught.
Despite this difference, the role modeling arguments with respect to
both race and sex are equally and profoundly unpersuasive, for reasons
that are again most apparent when one moves back and forth between
sex and race. The most obvious problem is the reinforcement of damag-
ing stereotypes. The fact that stereotypes damage both boys and girls
does not make the damage less serious. It might be tempting to claim that
the gender role modeling argument is based on biology and thus not a so-
cial construct. It is also possible, however, that the biological difference
makes the reinforcement of damaging gender stereotypes more, not less,
of a problem, since biological difference gives an aura of scientific legiti-
macy to gender roles—just as the science of race differences was used
at one time to legitimize the subordination of racial minorities. In fact,
both race and gender role modeling represent adaptations to social reali-
ties that intentionally, not just incidentally, are designed to fit into and
recreate the realities to which they adapt.
The role modeling argument with respect to race draws on a non-
biological justification; in fact, nowhere is the non-biological character of
race more apparent than when one classifies a child whose parents are
black and white, as black. This classification thereby more noticeably
participates in the process of racial subordination and, thus, is troubling on
that account. Does it help that, like other affirmative actions which many
do not oppose, society participates in this process only in order to take
account of and address a child’s problems in living in a racially discrimi-
natory society? Palmore would seem to say no—that taking account of
racial prejudice is not a sufficient basis for race discrimination.
Whatever the reach of Palmore, there are other defects in role
modeling arguments that are fatal and apply equally to race and sex.
First, these arguments assume that there is some ideal identity of gender
or race: the “something” that one parent, on account of his or her sex or
race, is presumed to do better. But, how would is this something ever to
be defined? For girls, is it to put being a wife and mother above all else?
To attract boys? To compete hard at sports? To excel at school? To
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camp, fish, and use a gun? How should an appropriate race identity be
defined? What behaviors, or attitudes, does this entail?
Even if it was possible to say from which model of “identity” a child
would benefit—requiring judgments that are obviously perilous, at best—
it cannot be reliably assumed that a parent of the same sex and race as
the child will be better able to model that identity than that the other par-
ent. A mother does not necessarily model better attitudes and behaviors
for her daughter than the girl’s father, nor can it be assumed categori-
cally that a white woman who has married a black man has, as between
the two, less understanding of the needs of her biracial child.
Finally, both race-matching and sex-matching arguments assume
that a child whose parents do not live together will be parented by only
one residential parent. Ordinarily, however, it is expected that a child will
have some continuing contact with both parents, even if more time is
spent with one parent than the other. Both parents remain role models.
The intact, nuclear family does not require a child to choose between role
models. Family dissolution should not require this either.
IV. THE NON-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
Hopefully, I have persuaded you that looking at issues of race and
sex discrimination in custody decision-making side-by-side reveals com-
plexities that help one to understand each better. While the way one runs
the analogies, as well as the particular insights that any one person might
gain from a comparative study, will vary based on one’s different experi-
ences and expertise, it is possible to learn something about race discrimi-
nation by looking at sex discrimination, and vice versa. For this reason, I
consider that the chase Professor Gregory led me on was well worth-
while.
In terms of legal standards, however, the analysis presented in this
Lecture does not lead to the more nuanced, alternative principles for
each type of discrimination that might have been expected. To the con-
trary this analysis strengthens the case for applying the same non-
discrimination standards for race and sex in custody cases. In the re-
mainder of this Lecture, I outline in very broad terms what these stan-
dards should be. These are the Principles that I have been developing,
with the help of Professor Gregory and others, for the ALI.
First, discrimination should be categorically prohibited. The ALI
principles prohibit consideration of the race, ethnicity, or sex of the parent
or the child, in exactly the same terms.60 This precludes consideration of
60. See supra  note 7.
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the race of the person a parent marries. It means applying the same cri-
teria to mothers and fathers, not a double standard. It means no race-
matching or sex-matching. It does not mean that a child’s need for a
healthy self-image, whether it relates to sex or race, cannot be consid-
ered.61 A parent’s ability to meet a child’s needs for a positive self-image
should be relevant to the same extent as other parental abilities. How-
ever, nothing should be presumed about a parent’s ability based on his or
her race or sex. This is, for the most part, the current state of the law
with respect to race,62 and it prohibits the preference some jurisdictions
61. See, e.g., Lee v. Halayko, 590 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div. 1992) (affirming cus-
tody award of biracial children to mother after trial court considered her plans to build a Chi-
nese cultural center in her community and to have the children learn the Chinese language);
Henggeler v. Hanson, 510 S.E.2d 722, 725 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding trial court award
of custody of adopted children to mother because she was “‘mindful of the delicate issue of
the children’s Korean heritage and their need for diversity in their environment’” while the
father was not) (quoting final order of the Family Court for Charleston County, awarding
custody to mother); Jones v. Jones, 542 N.W.2d 119, 123-24 (S.D. 1996) (finding that it
was proper for the trial court to consider which parent was more prepared to expose the
children to their ethnic heritage); cf. Tubwon v. Weisberg, 394 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (affirming custody of child of black, American Indian, and Irish heritage to Jew-
ish stepfather over unfit mother, after trial court found that “‘[b]oth parties seek to expose
the children [to] and educate them with respect to these different cultures’”) (alteration in
original) (quoting findings of fact by the trial court below); Harris v. Harris, No. E-87-11,
1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9996, at *1, 7 (Dec. 11, 1987) (concluding that award of biracial
children to black father was supported by the evidence, after trial court gave “‘little weight’”
to the fact that the children were biracial) (quoting finding of trial court below).
62. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914 (1997) (stating that race, color, or national
origin “shall not be a conclusive consideration” in custody and visitation matters); WIS .
STAT . ANN. § 767.24(5) (West 1993) (“The court may not prefer one potential custodian
over the other on the basis of the . . . race of the custodian.”); In re Marriage of Brown, 480
N.E.2d 246, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that Palmore prohibits consideration of
whether biracial children would be better served by rearing them in a black home rather than
a white one).
Cases addressing the issue of race in disputes between nonparents and parents, or in
the adoption context, are more mixed. See, e.g., In re the Petition of D.I.S. for the Adop-
tion of S.A.O., 494 A.2d 1316, 1323-24 (D.C. 1985) (affirming trial court order of adoption
to grandmother, based in part on the “trauma [the child] would face in adolescence in
searching for her roots if placed with [white foster mother], and [the grandmother’s] greater
ability to foster the child’s sense of her Guyanese/Latino heritage”); In re the Guardianship
of Astonn H., 635 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (Fam. Ct. 1995) (asserting that race is one factor
among many to be considered in a dispute between lesbian partner of deceased mother and
paternal grandparent); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 626, 632 (Pa. 1983) (holding that the
court would uphold award of custody of biracial child to black foster parents instead of older
white couple with whom child had lived, based on a number of considerations, including race).
Even in the adoption context, however, the authority of earlier cases approving considera-
tion of race in adoption cases has been substantially shaken by federal legislation prohibiting
the denial to any individual of the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent on
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the individual or child involved. See 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(18) (Supp. III 1998). No state now mandates consideration of race in adop-
tion or foster placements, with Illinois being the last state to eliminate such a mandate. See
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still allow for a parent of the same sex as the child63 especially during or
right before adolescence.64
750 ILL.  COMP . STAT . ANN. 50/15.1(b)(8) (West Supp. 1999) (repealing 750 ILL.  COMP .
STAT . ANN. 50/15.1 (West 1998) (allowing consideration of “race, ethnic heritage, behav-
ior”)); see also  WASH.  REV.  CODE ANN. § 26.33.190(2)(e) (West 1997) (requiring discus-
sion with prospective adoptive parents of “[t ]he relevance of the child’s racial, ethnic, and
cultural heritage”). Other states have been reducing the role race plays in adoption place-
ments. Compare, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 222.35 (West 1994) (making placement with an
adoptive family with the same racial background or ethnic identification a priority), with,
e.g., CAL. FAM.  CODE § 8708(a) (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting categorical denial of the
opportunity to adopt based solely on race, color, or national origin). Case law is also moving
increasingly away from allowing consideration of race in adoption and foster care place-
ments. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 309-10, 318 (3d Cir. 1989) (up-
holding preliminary injunction against city’s removal of black child from white foster par-
ents solely on the basis of race); Reisman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp.
356, 364 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding that automatically assigning a black heritage to bira-
cial children and prioritizing adoption placements in homes with black parents violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
63. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 25-403(E) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that
a court “shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent’s sex”); ME.  REV.
STAT . ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(4) (West 1998) (stating that “[t ]he court may not apply a
preference for one parent over the other . . . because of the parent’s gender or the child’s
age or gender”). In other jurisdictions, the prohibition of a preference for the same-sex par-
ent has been established by case law. See, e.g., Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029, 1037 (Md.
1998) (applying Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, which provides that gender is not a
“permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or men”); Seeley v. Jaramillo,
727 P.2d 91, 94-95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing modification of custody of three-year-
old child from father to mother, which had been based on expert testimony that child should
be with the mother in order to have an appropriate role model); Synakowski v. Synakowski,
594 N.Y.S.2d 852, 853-54 (App. Div. 1993) (affirming award of custody of daughters to
father by trial court, which disregarded expert testimony that, all else being equal, young
children should be placed with the same-sex parent); Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152, 158
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (rejecting mother’s claim on appeal that female children should be
placed with the mother); Hubbell v. Hubbell, 702 A.2d 129, 132 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the
trial court erred in applying preference for same-sex parent, in awarding custody of child to
father instead of child’s primary caregiver mother).
64. Alabama does so by statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1998) (providing that
“the court may give the custody . . . having regard to . . . the age and sex of the children”).
Other jurisdictions leave vague whether their general prohibition against sex-based presump-
tions would apply to a preference in favor of the same-sex parent. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-3(a)(1) (1999) (providing that “there shall be no prima-facie right to the custody of
[any minor] child . . . in the father or mother”); VA.  CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Michie
1995) (stating that “there shall be no presumption or inference of law in favor of either
[parent]” in awarding custody of children). For cases approving custody which assume that
children derive greater benefit from living with the parent of the same sex, see In re Mar-
riage of Arcaute, 632 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (approving trial court’s rea-
soning that “‘other things being equal, pre-adolescent children and adolescent young people
derive substantial benefits from the close personal relationship with the same sex parents to
whom they look for a model’”) (quoting from the lower court’s written order); Warner v.
Warner, 534 N.E.2d 752, 754-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming trial court’s custody award
that was partly based on the testimony of a psychologist that “as a child gets older, being
able to identify with a parent of the same sex is important”); Krotoski v. Krotoski, 454 So.
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Second, custody standards to determine what is in a child’s best in-
terests should be more determinate. The ALI standards offer determi-
nacy by presuming that custody will be allocated to parents in proportion
to the share of caretaking each parent undertook before the divorce.
Past caretaking patterns are a good guide to which parent is best able to
care for the child and which parent has the closest emotional tie to the
child. They also provide a more objective basis for decision-making,
thereby cutting down on litigation and strategic behavior. Most impor-
tantly for present purposes, when the standards are more determinate,
there is less opportunity for courts to allow unconscious race and gender
stereotypes to intrude. If the more determinate standards contained in the
proposals were the law, none of the instances of race or sex discrimina-
tion referred to in this Lecture should occur.
Whatever non-discrimination provisions exist, it is important to real-
ize that ending race and sex discrimination is not simply a question of
getting the legal standards right. The law can prohibit race and sex dis-
crimination in a firm and decisive manner, but not be able to recognize
either when they occur. Indeed, it is the recognition of discrimination,
rather than the commitment to end it, that poses the most significant im-
pediment to its elimination in today’s society. This Lecture has tried to
show that race and sex present patterns and habits of thinking that are
similar in some ways and different in others—looking at them together
may help to break up those patterns and enable society to better recog-
nize the ways in which race and sex should not matter, but do.
2d 374, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (noting testimony of two experts that “‘it would be more
beneficial to the child to be with a same-sex parent during the difficult puberty transitional
years” in its affirmation of the trial court’s custody award of daughter to mother) (quoting
testimony of two experts who testified at trial); Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D.
1994) (upholding custody award of daughter to mother, appellate court concluded that trial
court’s questions about who would help teach the child “‘certain things that a girl should
learn that [are] easiest to learn from a woman’” were “not motivated by or evidence of gen-
der bias”) (alteration in original) (quoting trial court’s questioning of father’s mother);
Weber v. Weber, 512 N.W.2d 723, 725-27 (N.D. 1994) (determining that the trial court
award of custody of son to father was not clearly erroneous, even though based in part on
testimony by expert, who had not met with the mother, that boys are better off with their
fathers).
